It is well known that the epistemology of Clement of Alexandria has a strong Neoplatonist flavour, in that it stresses the need for a transcendent and extra-corporeal vision of the divine. However, unlike Plotinus, Clement uses the language of gnosticism to convey the fundamental aspects of his theory of knowledge. Again unlike Plotinus, and unlike Irenaeus, the first great Christian adversary of the gnostics, Clement's own polemic against gnostic speculation is mitigated by a genuine interest in this particular branch of heterodox Christianity: he even chooses to build his own theology around its key term, yv6)ut?. On the level of terminology this marks a clear break with earlier representatives of Christian thought, such as Paul, for whom the idea of niaitg was the cornerstone of religious epistemology. Statistically speaking yvrocrtç is a minor term in Pauline vocabulary, whereas a glance at Stahlin's indexl shows it to be the principal technical term used by Clement.
Clement's gnosis can of course be considered in two ways: as a body of esoteric teachings, or as a manner of grasping the deity. Clement may well have envisaged a detailed system of gnostic teaching, as is suggested by Dani6lou,l but it is certain that the term designates a certain kind of approach to God. The true gnostic is destined to become a celestial creature, to gaze upon God face to face and to enter into a form of ontological union with this highest form of reality. Subjection to the body and to its imperatives was to be overcome in order to free the mind from the shackles which would mar its perception of supra-terrestrial reality. Accordingly ordinary human concepts are considered inadequate and even misleading, since the nature of God is totally other: his "otherness" implies his ineffability and incomprehensibility.
Negative theology replaces cataphatic, or propositional, theology. Within this perspective, the ethical side of early Jewish Christianity is lost within a general epistemological approach to religion, since the flesh and sins of the flesh are simply considered to be impediments to the s1to1t'tEía, or the mystic contemplation of the divine. The Stoic ideal of impassivity (à1tá3Eta) is pressed into the service of a theory of knowledge; he who is free from the passions is more alive to the appreciation of higher forms of existence.
Between these two extremes lies the possibility of an intermediate or preparatory form of knowledge, and in fact Clement did accept the need for props in the course of the soul's pilgrimage. I have shown elesewhere3 that he looked to secular culture for certain insights, and of course the catechetical teaching of the early church fell into this category of initial intellectual training. This partial apprehension of true reality is often expressed by Clement through the image of the mirror, in most cases by means of an interpretation of 1 Cor. 13,12: BÀÉ1tO?EV yap dpn 61° £«6K-Thou ?V aiviypait, Tore 8E Kp6«wKov Kp6g np6cyo)nov. The mirror was a frequently used instrument of divination in Hellenistic culture: Clement himself condemns it at one point, together with a number of other objects (dice, ball, hoop, apples, top, and a tuft of wool) as an element of pagan divination rites.4 To this passage may be added a number of others collected by Netoliczka in Pauly-Wissowa,5 Reitzenstein,6 Dupont,' Huged68 and others. A good example of such practices may be found in a text of Zosimus9 dating from the early fourth century and describing a special metal based on a compound of silver and gold, supposedly invented by Alexander and used by him for the fabrication of mirrors which possessed certain magical properties: such mirrors could deflect lightning, protect from demons, and had the power to transform
